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￿ An ambitious, comprehensive and high-standard trade and investment agreement
between the European Union and the United States is feasible, but a key concern
is whether the transatlantic trade partners will succeed in creating a meaningful
agreement within the tight timeline of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership (TTIP) negotiations. The target of a ratified pact before a new European
Commission takes office in November 2014 is an objective that is likely to conflict
with the level of ambition on the substance.
￿ Regulatory congruence would require the unilateral and unconditional recognition
by the TTIP partners of each other’s standards, procedures and conformity assess-
ment tests. The way forward is to create a ‘living’ (or progressive commitment)
agreement on regulatory cooperation with a horizontal template for coherence and
conformity assessment and a detailed monitoring mechanism, with implementa-
tion starting immediately for a few selected sectors.
￿ Regulatory harmonisation under TTIP may not lead to emerging markets automa-
tically upgrading to the higher TTIP standards. Domestic priorities and the high
demand from a rising price-sensitive group of consumers will likely result in a dual
regulatory regime in emerging markets in the medium-term.
Suparna Karmakar(suparna.karmakar@bruegel.org) is a Visiting Fellow at Bruegel. This
Policy Contribution was prepared as written evidence to the UK House of Lords European
Union Committee (Sub-Committee on External Affairs) enquiry into the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership, which started in October 2013. The author gratefully
acknowledges comments and helpful suggestions from André Sapir and Guntram B. Wolff.
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place during this week in
Brussels were cancelled
because of the US govern-
ment shutdown that lasted
from 1-16 October.
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Centre for Economic Policy
Research.
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5. The TTIP is expected to
generate new momentum
for multilateral liberalisation
and provide a boost to trade
and economic growth in the
EU and the US. It will also
reinforce the global influ-
ence of the two parties as
international standard- and
rule-setters. This directly
reflects the unease in the
industrialised world about
the turbo-charged rise of
the developing economies
in the last decade, and the
fear that the global order is
no longer dictated by the
west, which is seeing an
erosion of its ability to
stand up to an increasingly
powerful China with the
latter’s growing economic
heft; the present turbulence
in the emerging markets is
not likely to change the
trend.
6. Ulrika Lomas (2013)
‘Second Round Of TTIP Talks
To Get Underway’, Tax-
News.com, 4 October.
7. The US Federal Railroad
Administration confirms
that its railroad safety advi-
sory committee, Amtrak,
the federal government’s
passenger rail operator and
THE EU-US TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVEST-
MENT PARTNERSHIP (TTIP) NEGOTIATIONS are
aimed at concluding an ambitious, comprehen-
sive, and high-standard regional trade and invest-
ment agreement that offers significant benefits in
terms of promoting international competitiveness,
jobs, and growth in the partner countries. TTIP
would seek to liberalise, as much as possible,
trade and investment between the two blocs in the
20 areas that the agreement is expected to cover.
The negotiations started in February 2013 and the
negotiating parties completed a first round of talks
in Washington in early July. The second round of
negotiations was scheduled to be held in Brussels
in the second week of October1.
A CEPR study2 estimated that an ambitious and
comprehensive agreement could bring significant
economic gains for the EU as a whole (approx.
US$88.7 to $155.1 billion a year until 2027,
depending on the level of ambition of the negoti-
ated agreement) and the US (US$64.4 to $123.5
billion a year), while also increasing global income
by almost US$130 billion annually as a result of
increased bilateral trade. If an ambitious and com-
prehensive agreement that reduces behind-the-
border impediments to trade and investment is
concluded, it is likely to increase the annual GDP
of both parties by 0.5 to 3.5 percent, depending
on the degree of integration. Together, the US and
the EU already account for almost half of global
GDP and a third of world trade; each day, goods
and services worth US$2.7 billion are traded bilat-
erally3. The stock of shared direct investment adds
up to more than US$3.6 trillion.
KEY CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS
As much as 80 percent of the total potential gains
from the TTIP would come from cutting costs that
arise from administrative procedures and diver-
gent regulations (so-called non-tariff barriers or
NTBs), as well as from liberalising trade in services
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and public procurement. Although tariffs between
the US and the EU are already low (on average 4
percent), the cost of dealing with unnecessary
bureaucracy can add a tariff-equivalent of 10-20
percent to the price of goods4, which (although
usually borne by the consumer) affects the com-
petitiveness of domestic producers and exporters
in highly cost-sensitive modern global value
chains. ECORYS estimates that eliminating even
half of the NTBs caused by regulatory divergence
could increase transatlantic GDP by half a percent,
or US$150 billion. But tackling the NTBs is not
easy. The two trade partners have been dis-
cussing regulatory harmonisation in key traded
products/sectors for nearly two decades, since the
adoption of the Transatlantic Declaration in 1990.
Furthermore, as most of the gains are expected to
emerge from eliminating bilateral regulatory and
beyond-the-border barriers (the impact of which
on increased trade flows is both difficult to meas-
ure and attribute), the inability to reduce the NTBs
implies that a large part of the projected trade
gains may remain unrealised.
Reducing the remaining tariffs will be harder than
imagined: the reason why high tariffs on sugar,
textiles and garments, steel, and trucks have
existed for so long is because of powerful vested
interests that are loathe to relinquish their advan-
tages; tackling these interests would require a
political appetite to challenge key constituencies
in a time of weak economic prospects. Finally, the
TTIP negotiations are not all encompassing; they
will not cover agricultural subsidies, subsidies to
aircraft manufacturers, or movement of temporary
workers. Nor will they comprehensively cover IP
rules and financial sector regulation. Therefore,
notwithstanding the different studies that have
outlined the economic and strategic benefits of
TTIP, the debate on the feasibility of a deep trade
agreement and even its desirability is still open.
More critically, the TTIP has rather ambitious nego-03
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others are working on
safety design standards
that would allow multiple
units to operate in the US.
“There is broad consensus
on the path forward,”it says
(Robert Wright (2013) ‘US
commuters: Land of the
freeway starts to steer clear
of the car’, Financial Times,
27 May.
8. Current EU/US auto NTBs
are equivalent to an ad val-
oremtariff of 26.8 percent
(Ecorys ,2009; see footnote
4), the elimination of which
would require FTA negotia-
tors to recognise among
other things both
economies’ standards in
car-safety tests, ie US and
EU accepting vehicles that
adhere to the ECE standard
and America’s FMVSS regu-
lations.
9. John F. Morrall (2011)
‘Determining Compatible
Regulatory Regimes
between the U.S. and the
EU’, US Chamber of Com-
merce White Paper, Annex C
describes the slow progress
of past efforts.
10. Tom Donohue, the head
of the US Chamber of Com-
merce, has said he was
concerned that in the rush
to get a deal done before
the end of the year the US
might give up too much
ground on key intellectual
property and investment
provisions: “ . . . this is going
to be a great deal when it
gets done. Let’s just not
rush it.”Source: Donnan,
Shawn (2013) ‘US business
groups warn against com-
promises in Pacific Rim
trade talks’, Financial
Times, 26 September. 
11. A Bruegel Policy Contri-
bution on this subject is
forthcoming.
12. The workshop was con-
ducted under Chatham
House rules; consequently
this Policy Contribution will
not directly attribute the
views expressed.
‘Despite the growing exchange of information and the increasing cooperation between
transatlantic regulators on standards-related issues, experience in important sectors indicates
that the long-delayed, much-needed standardisation is not easy to achieve.’
However, despite the growing exchange of infor-
mation and the increasing mutual trust and coop-
eration between transatlantic regulators on
standards-related issues, the experience in impor-
tant sectors such as automotive safety and emis-
sions standards indicates that the long-delayed,
much-needed standardisation is not easy to
achieve8. Dialogues with the goals of reducing
NTBs have continued at varying levels of alacrity
and with different structures, frameworks and
roadmaps, but binding agreements have generally
been indefinitely postponed, as a review of the
official statements from US-EU summits and high-
level meetings reveals9. The review indicates that
the recent upward swing may not be enough to
achieve meaningful mutual recognition agree-
ments (MRAs) in the short TTIP timeline. Credible
progress within the deadline thus calls for an
acknowledgement that key differences exist
between the two regulatory regimes, with critical
implications for the modality choice for achieving
regulatory coherence. Recent experience at the
US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotia-
tions has also clearly shown the unease of US
business sectors over the possible sacrifice of
ambition in the interests of a timely conclusion of
a trade agreement10.
The remainder of this note presents an assess-
ment of the most viable modality for achieving
transatlantic regulatory cooperation under the TTIP
and the third-country impact of such convergence,
in particular on large emerging markets like China.
This is based on ongoing work at Bruegel11, and
has benefitted from a July 2013 Bruegel Work-
shop12on The Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP): Towards regulatory conver-
gence?
FINDING A WAY THROUGH THE REGULATORY
MAZE – WHAT CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE
ACHIEVED BY END-2014?
Past research undertaken by Bruegel shows that
FTAs concluded by the EU and US tend to entrench
the regulatory philosophy and practice of their
tiation targets, aiming for a ratified pact before a
new European Commission takes office in Novem-
ber 2014, an objective that is likely to conflict with
the level of ambition on the substance. In the run
up to the second round of TTIP negotiations, nego-
tiators on both sides seemed committed to press
for an ambitious outcome on a number of key
issues and seek provisions that will make the EU
and US regulatory systems more compatible and
help shape global rules on trade5without watering
down the existing set of rules and regulations. Cur-
rent negotiations and roadmaps aim to establish
the “common foundations for an ambitious and
transformative TTIP”, and it is hoped that a com-
monly agreed outline of the regulatory and rules
component of the TTIP will be ready by early
20146. Since the European Parliament is involved
in trade negotiations, the May 2014 election can
be considered as another deadline.
Concluding a reasonably ambitious deal in the
next six months thus may be difficult to achieve
as it would require arriving at a mutually accepted
modality for implementing transatlantic regula-
tory cooperation and coherence. Transatlantic
efforts to recognise each other’s regulations have
been a work-in-progress since 1990, some
notable recent achievements being: (1) Mutual
Recognition of Certificates of Conformity for
Marine Equipment (2004), (2) Regulation of Civil
Aviation Aircraft (2011), (3) Common Under-
standing on Regulatory Principles and Best Prac-
tices (2011), (4) Partnership on Organic Trade
(2012), (5) Trusted Trader Program (2012), (6) EU
waiver on exports of Active Pharmaceutical Ingre-
dients (APIs) from the US (2013), (7) US accept-
ance of EU commuter and high-speed trains safety
rules (2013)7. A Transatlantic Economic Council
(TEC) set up in 2007 has the mandate to guide
work on economic convergence and harmonise
regulations on: cloud computing, e-vehicles, e-
health, e-mobility, energy efficiency, ICT trade
principles, innovation action partnership, nan-
otechnology, small and medium enterprise best
practices, etc.13. Henrik Horn, Petros C.
Mavroidis and Andre Sapir
(2009) ‘Beyond the WTO?
An anatomy of EU and US
preferential trade agree-
ments’, Blueprint7, Bruegel.
14. The estimated increase
in the US-EU bilateral auto
trade associated with the
elimination of tariffs and
NTBs alone accounts for
more than one third of total
estimated increase in bilat-
eral trade flows associated
with a successful TTIP nego-
tiation. Source: Francois et
al(2013), see footnote 2.
15. Derek Kreindler (2013)
‘Ford Calls For Harmonized
US-EU Vehicle Standards,





16. Based on 20 case stud-
ies and 3,000 observations
of risk-reducing regulatory
decisions in the US and EU,
it is concluded that overall
risk stringency is about the
same, with several of the
case studies showing diver-
gence explained by protec-
tionism and local rent
seeking. See Jonathan B.
Wiener, Michael D. Rogers,
James K. Hammitt and Peter
H. Sand (eds) (2010) The
Reality of Precaution: Com-
paring Risk Regulation in
the United States and
Europe, RFF Press.
17. This also calls for easier
rules of origin in MRAs.
Excessively constraining
rules of origin have proved
problematic for some of the
EU’s previous recognition
agreements.
In light of the past interaction between the EU and
US, and drawing on Europe’s internal market expe-
riences, it is clear that dramatic change in legisla-
tion (which would be entailed in case of
harmonisation or convergence of existing regula-
tions) on either shore of the Atlantic is not feasi-
ble. However, meeting the rather over-ambitious
timeline and the scope of negotiations is possible
if the partners agree to recognise unilaterally and
unconditionally the other’s standards, procedures
and conformity assessment tests; there is strong
evidence that US and EU product safety regulation
is likely to be deemed ‘compatible’16. European
Commission negotiators agree that although the
two sides have different but similar safety require-
ments when it comes to lights, door locks, brakes,
steering, seats, seatbelts and electric windows,
many of these could be formally recognised as
providing the same level of safety17. But attaining
it calls for a regulatory cooperation agreement that
goes further than statements of ‘intentions’ and
outlines ‘best practice objectives’.
What is needed is a ‘living’ (as in progressive and
not a one-time commitment) agreement on
regulatory cooperation with a horizontal (cross-
sectoral) template for coherence and conformity
assessment and a detailed monitoring
mechanism, with implementation started
immediately for a few selected sectors. An
agreement to avoid further fragmentation will
require cooperation when setting new rules, by
motivating regulators to cooperate at an early
stage as well as throughout the life-cycle of a
regulation. The Ecorys (2009) study finds that 75
percent of total potential TTIP benefits (combined
cost reductions for the EU and US by reducing
divergence and partially aligning regulatory
regimes) are in four sectors: motor vehicles (31
percent); chemicals, cosmetics, and
pharmaceuticals (19 percent); food and
beverages (14 percent) and electrical machinery,
including  medical devices (11 percent). Evidence
also indicates that regulatory regimes and sectors
that have the potential to provide the highest level
of benefits and cost savings are likely to be





‘What is needed is a “living” agreement on regulatory cooperation with a horizontal (cross-sec-
toral) template for coherence and conformity assessment and a detailed monitoring mecha-
nism, with implementation started immediately for a few selected sectors.’
respective trade hubs because these practices are
exported to the partners13, in effect dividing the
world into a de-facto dual regulatory zone. For
example, in the case of automotive safety stan-
dards, because the US is not a signatory to the
international 1958 United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Europe (UNECE) agreement, UNECE
regulations do not apply in the US. The US devel-
oped its own standards in parallel, the Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS), while in
the EU, the commercialisation of vehicles is based
on a type-approval system that relies more and
more on UNECE regulations partially replacing EU
legislation. These differences in regulatory envi-
ronments give rise to many costly measures that
hamper trade for EU firms exporting to the US, and
vice versa, and in turn for the rest of the countries
in their individual hubs. The potential overall gains
from regulatory congruence in TTIP from har-
monised practices between the two trade partners
are significant14.
An ambitious WTO-plus chapter on Sanitary and
Phyto Sanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT) measures, monitorable disciplines on
regulatory coherence and transparency, and reg-
ulatory compatibility in specific, mutually agreed
goods and services sectors will turbo-charge reg-
ulatory cooperation and enhance the two trade
partners’ competitiveness relative to other emerg-
ing market competitors, in particular China. How-
ever, the problem lies in identifying the mutually
acceptable binding modality of such cooperation
and coherence. Industry (and consumers) are
keen to see regulatory standardisation and mutual
recognition in key traded sectors, not from dereg-
ulation and the lowering of standards, but through
the elimination of wasteful and inefficient rules –
both existing and future – by sensibly recognis-
ing each other’s standards and procedural stream-
lining where possible, but never at any cost to
safety. In the contentious auto sector for example,
there is an industry-led call for mutual recognition,
which would ostensibly be some kind of reciproc-
ity agreement under which the US and EU would





18. Morrall (2011), see
footnote 9.
19. WTO (2013) World Trade
Report: Factors Shaping the
Future of World Trade,
Geneva.
regulatory regimes in the product safety area.
Having corresponding regulatory agencies in both
regions undertake Transatlantic Regulatory
Impact Assessments (TARIA) on significant
existing and pending product safety regulations
in these sectors, will further help in attaining
regulatory coherence18.
As for a viable model of arriving at regulatory
coherence, lessons from the EU single market
suggest enshrining the need for hard legal over-
sight and unconditional mutual recognition. Dis-
cerning ex-ante the optimality of a regulation
would be a complex and perhaps impossible task.
Experience from the Australia-New Zealand FTA
and the European Union Services Directive’s
mutual recognition exercises clearly show that
unconditional mutual recognition works best in
integrating markets with developed standards and
consumer expectations/cultural preferences, and
that recognition must precede harmonisation
efforts. Implementing regulatory coherence in a
meaningful way in the near future thus calls for
mutual recognition and equivalence that sets
clear goals to overcome the (largely known and
well documented) differences; the key steps to
follow are setting (1) clear equivalence principles,
(2) an enforcement mechanism, and (3) trans-
parency of processes. In particular, transparency
should be its guiding principle, with strong public
oversight and involvement of industry and con-
sumers. Without such legitimacy, it would be hard
to guarantee that the application of standards
would converge.
Clearly, creating a usable regulatory cooperation
template with horizontal elements that can be
tested immediately in selected sectors, is where
the transatlantic political capital needs to be
invested during the next few months; generating
early momentum is necessary. To meet the
targeted TTIP timeline, without sacrificing the
ambition of scope, the regulatory cooperation
agreement needs to be ‘living’ and to have
‘unconditional mutual recognition’ as a key pillar
of setting equivalence principles. The fact that
there is a healthy fear of Chinese standards
thwarting future market access prospects and ‘full
political support’ across the Atlantic, makes the
regulatory cooperation prospects under TTIP
brighter than in the past. In the case of TTIP, past
preparedness is waiting to be translated into a
clear and implementable roadmap.
IMPACT ON THIRD COUNTRY MARKETS –
CONVERGENCE IN EMERGING MARKET PRODUCT
STANDARDS
An important concern is whether regulatory har-
monisation under the TTIP will positively influence
standard setting in large emerging markets.
Assuming that the TTIP (and TPP) implements
deep liberalisation and achieves regulatory coher-
ence in the near future, a consequential restruc-
turing and/or fragmentation of global supply
chains remains a real threat for the large emerg-
ing markets, in particular China and India. These
economies may then react in the following ways.
First, they could adopt and upgrade to these new
rules, regulations and industrial standards, even
at some financial and political cost, in order to
reduce the business costs of serving a world
market. China took this approach when it adopted
and pre-committed to stricter WTO disciplines
during its accession process, which helped it to
become the world’s most competitive economy.
Indian exporters treat these costs as fixed before
making the decision to export to industrialised
country markets, often simultaneously meeting
both the US- and EU-led standards’ compliance
requirements (that are much higher than domes-
tic standards) in order to avoid rejection of con-
signments. Chinese and Indian experience of the
past decade has shown that pragmatically accept-
ing and adapting to new realities bears fruit.
Second, they could selectively refute the rules
and production standards, based on domestic
interests and the perceived market for their
products in the new global economic architecture
in which developing countries and their domestic
markets account for almost 40 percent of global
economic activity at current US$ levels, and more
than 50 percent at US$, PPP19. By 2050, it is
estimated that six of world’s seven largest
economies will be outside the OECD group. A more
likely possibility is that emerging markets might
operate on a sui generis dual regulatory regime in
the medium term in key areas such as product
standards and intellectual property (IP). Taking
the example of the TTIP negotiations, even if the
EU and US manage to harmonise and upgrade20. Despite the high growth
rates of emerging markets,
the real wage and purchas-
ing power gap is expected
to continue in the medium
term, and this coupled with
the forecasted exponential
growth in the lower-middle
classes would in turn re-
shape the global busi-
nesses. See Homi Kharas
(2010) ‘The Emerging
Middle Class in Developing
Countries’, Working Paper
No 285, OECD Development
Centre.





transatlantic regulatory regimes as a defence
against export competition from the rising Asian
emerging economies, especially China, it is
uncertain that they will be able to entice them into
adopting those rules simply out of fear of
exclusion.
The compelling reason for these economies to not
unilaterally upgrade to the higher standards and
rules, albeit harmonised, arises from the medium-
term demand structure and purchasing power of
the mass consumer in these economies. In 2011
the per capita GDP of Brazil was US$12,594, South
Africa US$8,070, China US$5,445 and India
US$1,489, while the average per capita GDP in
OECD countries was US$41,225, with the US per
capita GDP being US$48,11220. The demand
pattern is thus necessarily different. Middle-class
demand growth is also expected to be higher in
the emerging markets in the next few decades. In
such a situation, given that the effective demand
from the price-sensitive large emerging middle-
class is likely to remain high at home and in
similar developing countries that they can easily
serve, a mass domestic upgrading to the costlier,
'higher' regulatory standards, albeit desirable,
might not seem optimal to Chinese and Indian
policymakers. A more likely medium-term
outcome is the possibility of the creation of a dual
regulatory regime in emerging markets, with the
export-oriented firms in these economies
adopting the higher standards, while a large part of
the remaining producers servicing the domestic
market continue to use the old, less rigorous
standards and IP regimes; this will further
fragment regulatory regimes across the world. If
the emerging market domestic consumer group is
significantly large (although difficult to quantify,
this share is likely to remain around two-thirds of
the total population in China and India for the next
decade according to various estimates), the
incentive for emerging economy governments to
upgrade/sign up to more rigorous regulatory
standards will diminish, at least until the majority
of domestic consumers can afford to pay the
quality-premium on the higher-standard
discretionary products and services. 